Gestational But Not Genetic

Couple A's fundamental rationale for furthering its slickness might be that the gestational/carrying mother acted solitary(prenominal) as surrogate for what Couple A all on intended to happen--the biological birth of the mother's child. On this view, the fact that CAM do her testicle available to UCI specifically so that they could be apply to conceive. This, in fact, happened. Further, the intimately-established practice in society and in fairness of maternal surrogacy makes any pick out to biological connection with the fluff on the part of the gestational/carrying mother (CBM) irrelevant. The biological fact, coupled with the original intent of CAM and CAF is that CBM bore the child that was all along intended to be that of CAM.

Krause (188) deplores "scientists who charge ahead" in the " chartless and very sensitive territory" of technological reproduction. CBM and CFM sought gain from just such technical expertise of UCI, knowing that the eggs were non CBM's. CAM and CAF should not be penalized for UCI's misdirection of the successful fecundation of CAM's ovum. The child's inheritable connection to CAM should not be denied. Stanworth (19) quotes the dire well-disposed consequences of such denial, citing "clarity about who your parents are . . . [as] the indispensable foundations of a sound family life." The social consequences to the child of being deprived of ma

Shannon, Thomas A. Surrogate Motherhood: The ethical motive of Using Human Beings. New York: Crossroad, 1989.

Shannon asks whether "facts of biological contingency instal rights or entitlements to care[.] While such facts--such as infertility--may be unfortunate, do they create a situation of unfairness that society is oblige to remedy"? (Shannon 87). Shannon implies that the answer is no, but the very purpose of this fit out is to argue that the answer must be yes. The social baggage imposed on the child by a biological accident is the principal reason. The biological misappropriation of CAM's ovum, for social-nurturant reasons inuring to Couple B's benefit, creates a social obligation to the CAM's heritable child, supported by the biological reality of CAM's genetic parentage.

Cases of children of nurturant but not genetic parents who vigorously seek their genetic parentage are well documented (Orenstein 28ff). The fact that previous cases by and large entail searches for donor dads is an accident of technology, and there is no reason to aver that in future, genetic offspring of unknown mothers will not pursue egg donors. Indeed, the very purpose of bringing this case is to provide the foundation for alleviating the psychosocial pain and insecurity of future genetic searches.

ternal genetic connection should not be ignored, and improperly places "a legal construction on genetic ties" (Stanworth 22). The genetic claim of CBF also perpetuates the pernicious social custom of giving antecedency to the claims of a fertile father (CBF) over an infertile married woman (CBM). Consider the case of Baby Jessica, wherein a father who had been uninformed of his parentage as biological father, obtained custody of the child that his creator wife had given up for adoption (Blankenhorn 183). The actions of a trio party, his former wife who, although genetic mother, had freely adopted out the baby, concealed his claim on the child. This case is analogous, except that the third party, U
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